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CHAPTER XI
DUTY-CONNECTED OFFENSES
Duty-connected offenses are commonly classified into two
general categories, those committed in the performance of duty
and those committed while on duty but not in the performance of
duty. The line between the two categories is more than a little
blurred, and classifying a particular case as falling within one
category or the other can be very difficult. Broadly speaking the
distinction is, however, real enough, and the policy considerations
relevant to the allocation of jurisdiction between sending and re-
ceiving states are quite different for the two categories of cases.
Immunity for offenses committed in the performance of duty is
the most soundly based of all immunities claimed for visiting
forces. 1 Its recognition has none the less met with vigorous re-
sistance and, in individual cases, provoked controversies disrup-
tive of orderly international relations.
The Act of State doctrine does not, it is submitted, justify an
x "[T]he only immunity which a member of the United States forces
abroad could reasonably expect to obtain in the absence of agreement is for
offenses which he might have committed in the line of duty * * *." Attorney
General Brownell, Supp. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions On Agreement Regarding Status of Forces of Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 73 (1953).
Section 62 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 194, states:
"(1) Except as otherwise expressly indicated by the territorial state, its
consenting to the presence of a foreign force within its territory * * * im-
plies that it agrees that the sending state shall have the prior right to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction within the territory over members of the
force with respect to
(a) An offense committed by a member of the force in the performance
of duty * * *."
It should be noted that the Section speaks in terms of primary and
secondary jurisdiction, and not of complete immunity. Comment b on Sub-
section (1) sets forth at 194-195, the reason of policy supporting the posi-
tion taken: "The exercise of primary jurisdiction by the territorial state
over members of a force in such cases would interfere with the mission of
the force and the effective maintenance of its discipline."
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absolute immunity since the act is done in the territory of the re-
ceiving state. That doctrine, since it derives from an abstract
principle, is equally applicable to any representative of a state,
however trivial his duties. Invoking so sweeping an immunity
cannot be justified in every instance where the representative per-
forms his duties in another state. 2 There may nevertheless be a
sound functional basis for the immunity of members of the armed
forces for acts in the performance of duty. 3 Exercising criminal
jurisdiction over one who acts for a foreign state is intended to
and can prevent him from acting. There is, then, a direct inter-
ference with the conduct of the affairs and the advancement of the
interests of a foreign state. If, in the specific instance, those in-
terests are of sufficient moment—and where its armed forces are
involved there is much reason to say this is always true—there is
a strong case for according the immunity. Moreover, the member
of the armed forces is placed in a dilemma: to act is to violate
the law of the receiving state, not to act is to violate the mili-
tary law of the state he serves. Superior orders may not be a
defense when the act ordered is a violation of international law,
but fairness suggests that it should be a defense where only the
law of the receiving state is violated. This last argument loses
some of its force, however, from the fact that superior orders is
* Supra, pp. 32-41.
• "If we were to examine the immunity of visiting forces in light of the
general course taken by the law of immunities, we would be compelled to
conclude that the immunity which is accorded to members of the armed forces
as to offenses arising out of conduct in performance of official duty is like-
wise based, in part at least, upon the functional principle. The concession
of primary jurisdiction to the sending state is, in this aspect, a derivative
of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state itself and has as its purpose
the protection of the state against possible interference with its activities
through the exercise of jurisdiction over those persons who serve it. The
other function of the granting of primary jurisdiction to the sending state
is to permit it to maintain discipline amongst those who are performing
duties in its behalf. In these two respects, the immunity accorded by the
Agreement is not for the protection of the individual but for the protection
of his government. This explanation is not, however, wholly satisfactory in
that a further reason for this right of jurisdiction in the sending state is
that it would be unfair to the individual to expose him to criminal prosecu-
tion by the receiving state for an act he had been ordered to perform by
one acting on behalf of his own Government." R.R. Baxter, "Jurisdiction
over Visiting Forces and the Development of International Law," 52 Am.
Soc'y. Int. L. Proc. 174, 175 (1958).
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not generally a defense when pleaded by a member of the Ameri-
can 4 or British 5 armed forces accused of violating American
or British law, respectively.
Cases relating to the immunity of members of a visiting armed
force for acts done in the performance of official duty are sparse
and inconclusive. The famous case of People v. McLeod 6 denies
immunity. McLeod was tried in New York for murder for his
participation in the invasion of the United States by Canadian
forces and their attack upon the Caroline, & vessel belonging to
insurgents against the Canadian government. The decision was
disavowed by the United States 7 and has been much criticized
on the ground that what the defendant did, since it was in the
course of actual military operations, was legal under the laws
of war. Other American cases upholding immunity have relied on
* See Ehrenzweig, Soldiers' Liability for Wrongs Committed on Duty, 30
Cornell Law Quarterly 179, 201 (1944). The writer's conclusion is:
—
"The common law of military liability is applicable to members of the
armed forces of the United States and to those militiamen whose states have
not enacted immunity statutes. Older authorities rarely deviated from the
stringent principle of full liability for illegal acts, with regard to either
civil or criminal liability, whether such acts were committed under order or
voluntarily, under ordinary conditions, or in emergencies. A more recent
tendency seems to develop a rule of immunity for acts committed in good
faith * * *. In derogation of the common law rule the militia statutes of
most states have completely or partly immunized members of the militia for
acts performed on duty."
See also Roberts, Some Observations on the Case of Private Wadsworth,
51 Am. L. Reg. 63, 161 (1903).
6 Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 54 (Turner's ed., 1952).
e
1 Hill 377, 25 Wend 483 (1841).
7 The British minister asked McLeod's release on the ground the destruc-
tion of the Caroline was a "public act of persons in Her Majesty's service,
obeying the order of their superior authorities" which could "only be the
subject of discussion between the two national Governments" and "could
not justly be made the ground of legal proceedings in the United States
against the persons concerned." Webster said in this case "That an in-
dividual, forming part of a public force, and acting under the authority of
his Government, is not to be held answerable as a private trespasser or
malefactor, is a principle of public law * * *." Webster, Secretary of State,
to Mr. Crittenden, Attorney General, March 15, 1841, 2 Moore, International
Law Digest 24, et seq. (1906). For comment on the McLeod case, see 1
Hyde, International Law 821 (1922) ; Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod
Cases, 32 A.J.I.L. 82 (1939) ; Moore, Act of State in English Law, 126, et
seq. Compare In re B.P.Z.S. and others, Court of Justice, Netherlands New
Guinea, March 9, 1955, [1955] Int'l. L. Rep. 208.
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this ground, 8 and Horn v. Mitchell can be read as meaning that
this is the proper dividing line. 9 British text-writers have ac-
cepted the limitation on the Act of State doctrine of Regina v.
Lesley 10 and suggested that, with respect to members of the
8 In Arce v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 292, 202 S.W. 951 (1918), after General
Pershing invaded Mexico, a force organized at Monterey by direction of the
Carranza de facto government invaded Texas and fought a battle with two
companies of American cavalry. Several were killed on both sides. Four
Mexicans were captured and tried and convicted of murder. On appeal the
court held that a state of war existed; that if any authority to punish the
defendants existed, it was in the federal, not the state government; and
that if the state court had jurisdiction, the conviction was erroneous be-
cause the command was organized under the authority of the de facto
government and the troops were required to obey the orders of their superior
officers.
In Straughan's Case, 1 Ct. of Claims Reports 324 (1863-1865), The
Chesapeake, upon leaving Hampton Roads, was intercepted by a British
squadron, which demanded permission to search The Chesapeake for de-
serters. The demand was refused and the British squadron opened fire.
The Chesapeake struck its colors and the British removed from The
Chesapeake several seamen, including the husband of the claimant. The
claim was for wages during the period of detention by the British under
a statute the crucial clause of which referred to those "taken by an enemy."
The British government had disavowed the act of the admiral commanding
the squadron and offered payment for the injury to the seized seamen.
A dictum of the court stated, at 328: "The acts of a naval commander,
so far as other nations are concerned, are the acts of his government. His
government is responsible for them, must answer for them, and must atone
for them. There is no book or decision which calls such acts a private wrong,
and the officer a wrongdoer. * * * Neither the United States nor the in-
jured seaman could have prosecuted the captain and crew of the Leopard
in criminal tribunals, nor have recovered damages from them in courts
of law."
"232 Fed. 819 (CCA 1, 1916). The rationale of the court's holding ap-
pears, however, to be that there was insufficient evidence that petitioner's
acts were authorized by the German government; that a commission as first
lieutenant of the Landwehr (second reserve) Pioneers, dated August 18,
1908, was inadequate in this regard. There is a suggestion also that for im-
munity to exist the act must be "specifically authorized or avowed" by the
government.
10 26 Halsbury's Laws of England 253 (2nd ed. 1937), states that "The
official acts of every state or potentate * * * and of their authorized agents,
are acts of State. No action can be brought in respect of such acts, even
when the agent is a British subject, and, in carrying out the act of State,
is committing an offence against English law." A footnote states, however:
"It is doubtful whether this rule applies to acts committed in British terri-
tory by order of a foreign sovereign. There appears to be no direct English
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armed forces, immunity for acts in the performance of duty ex-
tends only to the "public and open employment of force" recog-
nized by international law as "lawful in case of actual war." xl
authority on the point (see, however, 1 Hale, P.C. 99), but in The People v.
McLeod (1841), 1 Hill 377, the Supreme Court of New York held that the
plea of 'act of State' afforded no defense to a British subject who com-
mitted a criminal act in American territory. This decision was the subject
of much comment, chiefly extra-judicial; Lord Lyndhurst, L. C, is said to
have agreed with it * * * but the Governments of this country, and the
United States expressed a contrary view * * *. R. v. Lesley, supra, to some
extent supports it * * *."
Dicey's Conflict of Laws, 164 (7th ed. 1958), states that "As regards
acts of State authorized by foreign Governments * * * the courts in Eng-
land would doubtless apply the same principle, at least in respect of acts
committed outside England." A footnote states that "The position with re-
gard to acts within the jurisdiction is uncertain; the Supreme Court of New
York has held that in such circumstances a plea of act of State will not
lie: The People v. McLeod (1941) 1 Hill 377. See R. v. Lesley (1860) 8
Cox C.C. 269, which appears to be in the same sense."
11 "The case for immunity has never been put higher than the public and
open employment of force, and there the legitimate limits of act of States in
this connection may lie. Perhaps a further limitation must be added—that the
acts themselves must be of a kind which international law recognizes as
lawful in case of actual war. It has been pointed out that English Courts
certainly do not 'admit to its full extent the principle that we cannot sub-
ject to our municipal laws aliens who violate such laws under the direction
of their sovereign.' " Moore, Act of State in English Law 131 (1906)
.
The same author, in reviewing the factors to be taken into account in
determining what is "matter of State," says "Secondly, there is the au-
thority under which the acts are done, and the nature of the acts them-
selves—whether the authority of the sovereign is the one thing needed, or
whether that authority confers immunity only upon such acts as are of an
obviously public character, and are lawful as between independent states;
and whether, apart from authority given by a lawful sovereign, some acts
are so essentially public in themselves as to be outside municipal jurisdic-
tion. Thirdly, the place in which the acts are done may be material
—
whether in our own territory, or on the high seas, or in the territory of
some foreign sovereign."
Compare the statement of the Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross,
in the House of Commons, March 10, 1948, quoted in 1 McNair, Interna-
tional Law Opinions 115 (1956), with reference to the status of British
forces in Palestine after the termination of the mandate: "It is the existing
law that, where an action is brought by a foreign subject in respect of
acts done by British soldiers or officials on foreign territory, which were
done on behalf of the Government, or adopted by the Government after they
were done, the defence of Act of State is a complete bar to any claim for
damages that may be made. It also is the existing law, as a matter of in-
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A general immunity for acts in the performance of duty,
rather than one so limited, has, on the other hand, been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court of Panama in Republic of Panama v.
Schwartzfiger 12 and the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil in In
ternational law, that, where we have Forces in occupation of foreign terri-
tory, it is recognized that they are entitled to do that which is necessary
for their own safety and protection, and that what they do in the course of
these duties on foreign territory is not justiciable in the courts of this
country or of any other country."
See also Amrane v. John, Civil Tribunal of Alexandria, Egypt, Jan. 14,
1932, [1931-1932], Ann. Dig. 174 (No. 90).
"24 Panama, Registro Judicial 772 (1926), 21 A.J.I.L. 182 (1927). A
workman at France Field, in the Zone, was severely injured. Schwartzfiger
was ordered to rush the injured man to Colon Hospital in an ambulance.
The ambulance, while being driven across Colon at a speed in excess of the
legal limit, struck a business establishment and killed a man. The Supreme
Court concluded the Panama courts had no jurisdiction.
The case has been cited as holding that under international law visiting
forces enjoy complete immunity from the jurisdiction of a country in which
they are stationed. It seems clear, however, that the Supreme Court (1)
considered that Panama was obligated by treaty to accord immunity to the
accused, (2) viewed the case as involving troops in passage rather than
stationed in the country and (3) adopted the view of the Procurador
General that the fact that the accused was acting in discharge of his duty
in driving the ambulance was crucial. Only in the opinion of the Proc-
urador General is a general immunity of troops stationed in a country
mentioned, and then only in a general discussion of the authorities.
Assistant Attorney General Rankin commented regarding the wider in-
terpretation sometimes given the Schwartzfiger and Gilbert cases
:
"The cases thus stand for the proposition that the only defense of
immunity which has received sufficient recognition to be accorded any
weight is where the offense occurred in the line of duty. They accord
with the opinions of two of the most eminent international law au-
thorities, Lawrence and Oppenheim who expressly limit the immunity
to offenses committed in the line of duty or within the lines of the
visiting forces (Lawrence, Principles of International Law (6th ed.)
Sec. 107, p. 246; Oppenheim, 1 International Law (4th ed.) Sec. 445)."
Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, On H.J.
Res. 309, Part 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 266-67 (1955).
The Schwartzfiger case has not led in practice to the grant of a general
immunity for American forces in Panama.
"Pursuant to an informal agreement in 1943 between our military au-
thorities and the commandant of the Panamanian National Police, military
personnel who commit offenses within the Republic and who are appre-
hended by the Panamanian authorities are frequently turned over to the
United States authorities for disciplinary action. Local authorities, our
authorities there, state that Panamanian authorities rarely refuse to re-
217
re Gilbert. 1 *
linquish their primary jurisdiction when requested to do so." General Hick-
man, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee On Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1955). But in the period from Dec. 1, 1958 to
Nov. 30, 1959 Panama waived its jurisdiction in only 20 of 167 cases. Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee On
Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., (1960) 24.
18 Brazil, Supreme Federal Court, November 22, 1944, Diario da Justice,
August 21, 1945, section Jurisprudencia (appended to No. 190, pp. 2969-
2972); [1946] Ann. Dig. 86 (No. 37). On February 18, 1944, a Brazilian
citizen, Jose Domingues Ramos, tried to enter the Admiral Ingram Camp in
Recife (Pernambuco) in order to obtain payment of a bill from an Ameri-
can marine stationed there. This camp was a part of the American military
bases temporarily established in Northern Brazil during the Second World
War. The United States marine, Arthur James Gilbert, who was on guard
at the entrance to the camp, sought to prevent Ramos from entering.
Ramos persisted in his attempt and was shot by Gilbert; he died four
days later.
The court held the Brazilian courts had no jurisdicton. The opinions, like
those in the Schwartzfiger case, ranged over a wide area, and it is not easy
to pinpoint the basis for the decision. Again, however, on the facts the de-
fense that the defendant's act was done in the performance of official duty
was available, both opinions emphasize that aspect, and the decision is most
clearly supportable on that ground.
The Court, by Falcao, J., said in part, at pp. 87-88:
"But in those cases the offences were common penal offences com-
mitted by members of foreign armed forces who were present on
Brazilian soil but were not on duty at the time. These circumstances
necessarily led to the correct solution announced by the Government of
the United States in response to the vigorous protest of the Brazilian
representative. The present case, however, as appears from the pro-
ceedings, is quite different: the offender is a member of the armed
forces of a foreign country which are stationed within a limited zone
of the Brazilian coast with the express consent of the Government of
Brazil and for the purpose of taking part in war operations in which
our country also is engaged. Furthermore, the said marine committed
the offense in the exercise of his specific duty as sentry at the camp."
Azevedo, J., in a separate opinion, observed that
:
"No question would arise if both the offender and the victim were
members of the armed forces. As, however, the victim was a civilian,
a distinction must be made: if the crime were devoid of any military
aspect, the case would undoubtedly fall under the local jurisdiction.
However, the case before the Court is of a typically military character.
The act of the sentry who was guarding the camp was directed against
a person who resisted the order not to enter it. In my view, the fact
of the victim being a Brazilian civilian does not efface the pre-
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The position that visiting forces are immune for offenses com-
mitted in the performance of official duty is to be distinguished
from the position that such forces are immune for offenses com-
mitted while on duty. The latter concept predicates immunity on
the time when an act is done, rather than the nature of the act.
This is not to say there is no basis for immunity for acts com-
mitted while on duty. Subjecting a member of a visiting force to
criminal liability for a private act committed when he was on
duty does not interfere directly with the conduct of the affairs
of the sending state, nor call into question the propriety of an
act of that state. It does, however, involve claiming jurisdiction
over an individual when he is acting as an integral part of an
organized body of men serving the foreign state. Indirectly,
there is interference with the performance of his duty. The
functional basis for immunity for private acts committed while
on duty can be viewed as more substantial than for acts com-
mitted on leave, but much less compelling than for acts committed
in the performance of duty.
Discussions of immunity for duty-connected offenses often fail
to distinguish between offenses in the performance of duty and
offenses on duty. This is understandable. There is, unhappily, no
dominantly military character of the immediate defence of the camp's
security." Id., at 90.
Both opinions also appear to recognize the on-base concept, and there is
language in each which suggests recognition of a wider immunity.
A note to the report of the case in the Annual Digest reads
:
"For criticism of this decision see Accioly, "Conflito de jurisdicao em
materia penal internacional," in Boletim da Sociedade Brazileira de
Direito Internacional, I (1945), No. 2, pp. 96 ff. The author maintains
that the crime was not military under international law; that it was
not committed within the perimeter of the camp; that it represented an
offence against a Brazilian citizen; that it took place in circumstances
which would appear to have been a disturbance of the local public
order; and that for these reasons the Supreme Federal Court was
wrong in denying that Brazil had jurisdiction."
General Hickman, in the Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee On Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of
Forces Treaty, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1955), after stating that in Brazil
jurisdiction over American troops is concurrent except for two special
groups which enjoy diplomatic immunity, referred to the decision in In re
Gilbert and said: "It is understood that Brazilian authorities have agreed,
as a matter of policy, that United States military personnel who commit
offenses in Brazil will be turned over to United States authorities for trial,
and none of our people have been tried during the reporting period."
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sharp line which distinguishes one from the other. Even if atten-
tion is centered on the concept of offenses in the performance of
duty, it is quite impossible to chart an acceptable perimeter.
Limiting the concept to offenses expressly ordered will not suffice
since there are acts the performance of which is inherent or im-
plicit in every assigned duty. Nor can one easily draw a line
between the normally acceptable way in which a duty should be
performed and an abnormal, unacceptable way. An extreme
deviation from the norm may readily be labeled a private act,
but the middle ground presents real problems. Again, the deci-
sion regarding where the line should be drawn is inevitably in-
fluenced by the attitude taken toward how compelling a basis is
necessary to justify giving immunity. Also, it is difficult to
separate the issue from the related question of who is to deter-
mine whether an act was done in the performance of duty,
Finally, the draftsmen of agreements are handicapped by the in-
adequacy of language to draw a sharp line.
The view that visiting forces should enjoy immunity for acts
committed while on duty was expressed by Oppenheim 14 and
Lawrence. 15 It was developed primarily in the decisions of the
1* "This rule, however, applies only in case the crime is committed either
within the place where the force is stationed or in some place where the
criminal was on duty." 1 Oppenheim, International Law 847-48 (8th ed.,
Lauterpacht, 1955).
The U.S. Memorandum, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, op. cit. supra, note 12,
at 416, in arguing for general immunity for visiting forces, commented:
"Oppenheim also suggests that if a crime is committed outside of the
place where the force is stationed, the right of exterritoriality or im-
munity from the local jurisdiction applies only in case the crime is
committed 'in some place where the criminal was on duty'. Again there
is no definition of 'on duty' although the example given suggests that a
member of the armed forces while engaging in recreation or pleasure
is 'not on duty'. A soldier is never off duty in the sense in which that
term is usually understood by civilians. Even though temporarily per-
mitted to absent himself from strictly military tasks for recreation and
pleasure, he is still under the orders of his commanding officers and
responsible to them for his acts. Common law crimes as well as
ordinary breaches of discipline are military offenses for which he is
responsible whether they are committed when he is under immediate
command or not."
With respect to the statement that "A soldier is never off duty * * *,"
see Manuel v. Ministere Public, note 16 infra, in which the argument was
expressly rejected.
16 "The troops * * * would be under the jurisdiction and control of their
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Mixed Courts of Egypt, in terms of the concept of service com-
Tnande. 16 The Mixed Courts came in time to doubt that the simple
commanders as long as they remained within their own lines or were away
on duty but not otherwise." The Principles of International Law 246 (6th
ed. 1915).
16 In the Triandafilou case, supra, involving a member of the crew of a
warship, the court said
:
"Whereas, the sole question which presents itself * * * is that of
knowing whether Triandafilou was or was not carrying out a mission
under instructions at the moment when he committed the aggres-
sion * * *.
"Whereas the judgment * * * held that if Triandafilou came on shore
to discharge a duty (purchase of food for the needs of the ship), and
only with permission to return on board by midnight, he was no longer
on duty when, coming out of a bar on the Place Mohammed Ali in a
state of intoxication some minutes before midnight, he struck with a
knife an agent of the local police * * *.
"Whereas if the members of the crew of a warship enjoy the immunity
from jurisdiction of the vessel itself when they are on shore this is only
true in so far as they can be construed as agents for executing orders
which are given them in the interests of the vessel ; whereas it is in short
the immunity of the vessel which projects itself beyond the vessel for the
realization of its own ends; whereas such is the basis of the principle
which withdraws them from the local jurisdiction when they are on duty;
whereas it follows that these words should be interpreted not with
reference to the activities of him who has received the order but with
reference to him who has given the order and must take cognizance of
its execution ; and whereas in the instant case Triandafilou did not return
on board to give an account of his commission, and whereas he was there-
fore still on duty when he committed the aggression with which he was
charged; whereas it results from these considerations that the first
ground for the appeal is well granted * * *."
The basis for the broad exception recognized in the Triandafilou case is
better expressed in the opinion of the Court of Cassation in Ministere Public
v. Tsoukharis, Feb. 8, 1943, [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 150 (No. 40), a case in-
volving a Greek soldier who had been ordered to go from Alamein to
Amrich, instead went to Alexandria, and was involved with three other Greek
soldiers in an affray in which a British corporal was killed. The court,
after referring to its decision in Triandafilou, said
:
"The question arises whether the same rule applies to soldiers who
leave their military quarters. The exception in favour of a sailor on
shore on duty flows from the general principle of the jurisdictional im-
munity of armed forces. This principle is based on the tacit under-
standing to respect the sovereignty of a foreign Power, and should
therefore, logically, be extended to apply to soldiers who, though out-
side their military quarters, are regarded as forming an integral part
of the corps to which they belong. They would be so regarded where
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they are on duty under orders to carry out a mission for the needs
of the corps."
Shortly afterward, in Manuel v. Ministere Public, Court of Cassation,
Mixed Court, March 8, 1943, 39 A.J.I.L. 349 (1945), the court said that
"* * * there do not exist, in short, any serious divergences in the literature
except as concerns violations of common law disturbing the public peace and
security committed by a soldier outside of the military premises, either
against an inhabitant or against other soldiers, on condition, moreover, that
the offender is not on duty, for, in the latter case, he is considered as an
integral part of the forces to which he belongs * * *."
An armed force is, in other words, an instrumentality of a foreign state
such that there is a functional basis for immunity for the individual
soldier or sailor so long as he is a part of the force. He is a part of it when
he is within a camp or on a warship, or when he is physically separated
from the main body but still on duty. He is not when he is separated
from the main body on leave.
The Mixed Courts soon began to question whether this rationalization
could support an immunity so broad in scope as that recognized in the
Triandafilou case. They also began to doubt whether the certificate of the
accused's commanding officer as to his on-duty status—counsel for the
accused had relied on such a certificate in the Triandafilou case—should be
considered as conclusive.
The retreat began with the Tsoukharis case, supra, in which the accused
Greek soldier, ordered to go from Alamein to Amrich, went to Alexandria
instead. The Chambre du Conseil allowed the plea the accused was immune
on the ground it had to accept the certificate of his commanding officer that
Tsoukharis was on duty at the time of the offense. On appeal, counsel for
the state argued that the decision involved an abdication of the court's func-
tion to control the scope of jurisdictional immunities. (See Barton, 1954
Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 340, 353). The Court of Cassation, in reversing and sending
the case back on the ground the judgment appealed from did not state
sufficiently the reason on which it was based, said
:
"The decision of the Chambre du Conseil has held that Constantin
Tsoukharis was on duty, but has not specified this duty in a manner
which would enable the Court to decide whether the Chambre du
Conseil has properly applied the rules of public international law.
'Mission under orders' means a mission dictated by military require-
ments. It does not appear from the reasons given for the decision of
the Court below that such a duty existed in the present case. Further-
more, the order has to be looked at (as this Court has already held on
June 29, 1942) from the point of view of the person who gives it
and not from that of him who receives it. Applying this principle it
seems clear that the person giving the order is interested in the report
of the person sent, whereas the latter is interested in prolonging the
duration of the mission. // therefore there is no report to make there is
no order in question, and a soldier who abuses his mission to prolong
his leave will cease to be covered by immunity from jurisdiction. In
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fact that a soldier en service commands was "an integral part
of the forces to which he belongs" furnished an adequate basis for
immunity. They moved toward a more restricted view, but never
wholly abandoned the idea that an offense "en service commande"
was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending State. 17
The rule developed by the Mixed Courts, according immunity
for on-duty offenses, never enjoyed general acceptance,18 nor has
it found favor among treaty negotiators. It is not incorporated
in the NATO Agreement. It was not rejected by the negotiators
of that Agreement—an immunity for duty-connected offenses so
broadly conceived was never proposed or discussed.
More important, the NATO Agreement accords immunity even
for offenses committed in the performance of duty only in limited
degree. The sending state has primary, but not exclusive, juris-
diction over "offenses arising out of any act or omission done in
the performance of official duty." 19 Moreover, the receiving state
may even have exclusive jurisdiction over such an offense in the
event, probably unlikely, that it is "punishable by its law but not
by the law of the sending state." 20 The limited immunity granted
does, however, extend to the civilian component as well as to
members of a force.
There was vigorous opposition among the NATO negotiators
to according even this limited immunity for offenses committed
in the performance of duty. They were, of course, free to recog-
nize an immunity for such acts in such degree as they chose, or
deny it altogether, regardless of any rule of international law
on the subject.
Several representatives would have preferred to deny immunity
order that the Court of Cassation should be able to exercise its power
of judicial review it is essential that the alleged mission should be de-
fined with due regard to the facts." (Emphasis added.)
17 See the cases of Camboures, Cour d'Assises, Journal des Tribunax
Mixter, 26/27 January 1944, p. 2; Gougoulis, Cour de Cassation, J.T.M.
28-29 January 1944, p. 3; Scordalos, Cour de Cassation, J.T.M. 19/20 May
1944, p. 2; Mijouicetal, Chambre du Conseil, J.T.M. 24/25 August 1945, p. 3.
18 In the immediate post-World War II period, there were instances of
American troops being tried by foreign courts for on-duty offenses. State-
ment of the Department of State, Hearings Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 309, Part 2, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 556 (1955).
19 Article VII, para. 3 (a) (ii)
.
80 Article VII, para. 2(b).
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for official acts altogether,21 as did the Brussels Treaty.22 Under
that Treaty the receiving state was not even enjoined to give
"greatest sympathy" to a request for "transfer," i.e., waiver, in
such cases, as they were where an offense was inter se. This sug-
gests the basis for opposition to the immunity. The argument
that to exercise jurisdiction over visiting forces for offenses com-
mitted in the performance of duty is to interfere with the con-
duct of the affairs of a foreign state may be logically compelling.
For some, this consideration is outweighed by their grave concern
that the receiving state have jurisdiction in all cases in which
the victim is a national of the receiving state. The point was not
emphasized in this context in the NATO negotiations,23 but was
repeatedly made in relation to other issues. It was most vigor-
ously pressed in the debates in the British Parliament.24 The
""The first point discussed was whether subparagraph [3(a)] (ii) should
include offences committed in the performance of official duty. Several
Representatives were of the opinion that they should be excluded." MS-R
(51)14. The Portuguese representative had earlier put forward a redraft of
the criminal jurisdiction articles which made no reference to an immunity
for offenses committed in the performance of duty (MS-D(51)13) and
thereafter proposed that paragraph 3(a) (ii) be omitted (MS-D(51)16).
22 Page 145, supra.
23 The Belgian representative "wished to reserve judgment [on the United
States Draft] only with respect to cases where the victim of the offence
was a national of the receiving State, even if the offence was committed by
a member of an armed force on duty." MS- (J) -R( 51) 2.
24 The statements made are to be read in the light of the fact that the
Bill to implement the NATO Agreement, as introduced, apparently used the
phrase "in the course of duty" rather than "in the performance of duty."
The Home Secretary questioned that the difference in language was material,
but agreed it should be changed. In the course of the debate Mr. Michael
Stewart said
:
"I cannot understand on what principle anyone defends the proposi-
tion that a foreign soldier who does some damage * * * to the citizens
of the country which he is visiting should be exempt from answering
for those offences in the courts of the country which he is visiting
merely because it is alleged that what he did was done in the course of
his duty." 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 599 (1952). See also the comment
of Mr. John Strachey, id., at 578, comparing an immunity for inter se
offenses to that for offenses in the course of duty.
Mr. E. Fletcher moved an amendment to eliminate the clause relating to
the immunity. He said, after referring with approval to the immunity for
inter se offenses
:
"But the case is totally different where the offence is committed not
against a foreigner or his country but against a British subject. It is
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intensity with which this view may be held is illustrated by the
feeling aroused in Japan by the Girard case.25 One may surmise
that it is the peripheral situation, such as the Girard case, rather
than the case where the act was much more clearly in the per-
formance of duty, which prompts such concern.
The grant of immunity in the NATO Agreement for offenses
committed in the performance of duty was apparently included
at the insistence of the United States representative. He indi-
cated that it would extend only to a limited range of cases.26
that class of case which is really causing the greatest concern among
those who are troubled about this Bill.
"Therefore I would like to exclude from Clause 3 any offence com-
mitted against a British subject, even though it is committed in the
course of duty by a member of a foreign force." 505 H.C. Deb. (5th
ser.) 1158 (1952). See also a further comment by Mr. Stewart that
"This is, I think, the only part of the Bill in which the power of the
British courts to deal with the offence is set aside where the person
suffering from the offence is a British subject." Id., at 1161.
25 See p. 228, note 32, infra.
26 The United States representative, in explaining the United States Draft,
said that "The Draft provided that the Courts of the receiving State
normally exercised jurisdiction." The United States draft however laid down
two exceptions
:
"Article 6/2 (d). An offense against the laws of the receiving State arising
out of an act done 'in the performance of official duty' by a member of a
'contingent' or pursuant to a lawful order issued by competent authority.
Very few categories of cases of this type would arise; examples would be
sentinels using unnecessary force when on duty, or automobile accidents of
drivers proceeding on official duty." MS-R(51)4.
When at a later meeting, it was proposed that the clause according the
immunity be eliminated (see note 21, supra) the United States representa-
tive "pointed out, however, that there was a possibility of offences being
committed in the performance of an official duty." MS-R(51)14.
The Canadian representative, in MS-D(51)15, put forward a proposal that
"for the existing words in Article VII, paragraph 3(a) (ii)" there should be
substituted the clause "Acts or omissions done or omitted pursuant to an
order issued by a military superior of the State and carried out according
to the tenor thereof." He explained: "It would be most desirable to confer
on a receiving State a primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member
of a force or civilian component who carried out his superior's order in an
unlawful manner which resulted in injury or damage."
The Canadian representative returned to the point later, proposing that
the clause "should be expanded to include a further definition of offences
arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty,
which would be worded as follows in French: *et rentrant dans l'ordre des
devoirs de l'interesse'. The Working Group came to the conclusion that it
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Several other representatives nevertheless sought further to limit
the scope of the immunity, without success.27 Concern was also
expressed that the language in which the immunity was recog-
nized was too ambiguous, but apparently no one put forward a
more aptly phrased provision.28
It is not surprising, in view of the scanty record and the ad-
mitted difficulties which the negotiators encountered in delineating
the scope of the immunity they meant to confer, that disagree-
ments have arisen regarding its application in specific cases. The
Turkish authorities for a time took a most restricted view of the
reach of the immunity. "It was argued that the killing of a
pedestrain was not an act directly connected with the driving of
a truck on official business, and that a person ordered to go to a
place to perform certain duties and return was 'in line of duty'
while he was performing those duties, but not on his return
was very difficult first to find an equivalent expression in English and,
secondly, to define the circumstances in which an offense could be regarded
as falling within the limits of the duties of the person concerned. The
point would chiefly arise in a few individual cases where special circum-
stances were involved: an example had already been given * * * by the
Italian representative (MS-R(51)14)." MS-R(51)18.
" The Belgian representative proposed that the immunity should not cover
traffic accidents. MS-R(51)8.
The Italian representative proposed that "it should be specified that such
act was done not only in the performance of official duty, but also but
(sic) within the limits of such duty. He gave the example of a driver
travelling between two towns on official business who, for personal reasons,
deviated from the direct route. If an accident occurred in the course of the
deviation, the driver was no longer acting within the limits of his official
duty." MS-R(51)14.
28 The French representative, at an early meeting of the Judicial Sub-
committee, expressed approval of the United States draft, but thought "it
would be necessary to define more closely the concept of a member of an
armed force 'on duty.' " MS- (J) -R (51) 2.
At a later meeting of the Working Group the Canadian representative
proposed that in subparagraphs (1) and (11) the word "offences" should
be replaced by the phrase "acts or omissions." "Several delegations also
proposed further amendments [unspecified] to the definition of the offences
appearing in subparagraph (11)." MS-R(51)14.
The only changes made from the language used in the United States
draft were (1) changing "act" to "act or omission" and (2) at the sugges-
tion of the United States representative [MS-D(51)20], striking out the
clause "or pursuant to a lawful order issued by the competent authorities
of that State." MS-R(51)14.
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trip." 29 The French and Italian authorities have, on the other
hand, agreed that a member of the armed forces is in the per-
formance of official duty when driving his own car between his
home and his place of duty.
The clause "offences arising out of any act or omission done in
the performance of official duty" describes a class of acts. The
test prescribed concerns the nature of the act, not the status of
the actor. It is clear, then, that the clause does not cover all
offenses committed while the offender was on duty. The more
difficult question is what the nature of the act must be to fall
within the class. The crucial point is the meaning to be given
to the words "offences arising out of." The words could mean
"offences consisting of" or the equivalent, in which event the
immunity would extend only to acts or omissions done in the
performance of official duty. It seems more sensible to interpret
them as meaning "offences originating in," "related to," or, in
the language of the Turkish statute, "done in connection with."
This interpretation enlarges the class, but does not clearly define
its outer limits.
Those concerned with the interpretation of the clause have
understandably reached into other areas of the law for assistance.
The American military authorities have apparently interpreted
the provision as analogous to but somewhat broader than the
agency concept of "scope of employment." Much less useful is
the analogy to "line of duty" used in the Federal Tort Claims Act
and in legislation conferring benefits, narrowly interpreted in
29 Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreements : Criminal Jurisdiction 49
(1957). See also the testimony of General Hickman, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of Senate Armed Services Committee On Operation of
Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 28
(1955). The Turkish position, as has been said (Snee and Pye, ibid.) is in
line with the Italian and Canadian proposals, supra, notes 27 and 28, which
were rejected by the Working Group.
Turkish legislation (Law No. 6816 of July 16, 1956) was enacted that
the provision of the NATO Agreement was to apply to any "offense arising
out of any act or omission done in the performance of duty or done in
connection with the performance of duty," and this has enabled the Turkish
and American authorities more readily to reach agreement in specific cases.
The added language, "done in connection with the performance of duty,"
can be considered as a clarifying interpretation of the treaty provision, but
not as extending its intended scope. See Snee and Pye, ibid., and the testi-
mony of General Hickman, ibid.
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the first case, broadly in the second. The French interpretation is
apparently largely shaped by the concept of "en service com-
mands"; the Italian authorities based their conclusion regarding
the status of one driving between home and place of duty on the
ground that he would have been considered at work under the
Workmen's Compensation law.30
These analogies may be useful, but only within limits. Even
with respect to the concept of "scope of employment," one can
query whether the factors of policy which have shaped the limits
of the vicarious liability of a principal for the acts of his agent
are entirely relevant where the issue is not one of civil liability
or even criminal liability but of criminal jurisdiction. The diver-
gent interpretations of "line of duty" under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and the Acts conferring benefits on members of the
armed services suggest how irrelevant they are in interpreting
the quite different language of the NATO Agreement, addressed
to a quite different problem. There is need to remember that the
problem under the Agreement is a new and unique problem,
and that the language of the Agreement, "offenses arising out of
any act or omission done in the performance of official duty," is
new, and was a response to a particular need. That need was to
ensure the commanding officer's control over members of a force
in the carrying out of their duties, and hence to cast on the
sending state the responsibility for the manner in which those
duties are performed. If the act is not one which is or could be
considered to be related to carrying out the mission of the force,
it is not covered. This approach may not furnish a rule of thumb
for the solution of the hard case; it is, however, likely to prove
a surer guide than a concept drawn from another field, formulated
to solve quite different problems.31 Although this may suggest
80 See, generally, Snee and Pye, op. cit. supra, note 29, at 47-50.
81 Certain American military authorities in France have taken the position
that if one of the elements of a crime is that it be done with a specific in-
tent, the sending state cannot have primary jurisdiction, because the
presence of the specific intent is inconsistent with the act being in the
performance of military duty. Specifically, it was determined that, where
one assigned to a Special Services unit who was to arrange tours for
servicemen embezzled the money he collected instead of turning it over to
the French bus company, the United States did not have primary jurisdic-
tion because the intent to embezzle was inconsistent with his acting in line
of duty. The provision of the Treaty, however, establishes a test for
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that the class of cases over which the sending state has primary
jurisdiction is relatively broad, one should bear in mind the
issue is which state shall try and punish, not whether the
offender shall be tried and punished.
The Girard 32 case provoked the greatest controversy regard-
ing the correct interpretation of the provision. Girard was under
orders to guard a machine gun on a firing range being used by
the American forces. A Japanese woman was collecting cartridge
cases in the area. Girard placed a cartridge case in his grenade
launcher, fired, and killed the woman. Either he did so to guard
the machine gun, in which event he seemingly used excessive
force, or did so as the climax to a bit of horseplay which involved
enticing the victim and others within range and then frightening
them by launching cartridge cases in their direction.
The controversial issue was not whether Girard was guilty of a
crime under Japanese or American law. Presumably he was un-
der both, on either version of the facts. The issue was simply
whether the United States or Japan had primary jurisdiction to
allocating criminal jurisdiction, not a test of criminal liability. Moreover,
it gives primary jurisdiction to the sending state of "offences arising out of
acts or omissions done in the performance of official duty," and the words
"arising out of" must be given due weight. Perhaps the intent with which
an act was done would be relevant if the issue was whether the act was
done in the performance of duty, but it seems questionable that it is
relevant when the issue is whether it arose out of any act in the performance
of duty. If, in the case cited, the accused had deposited the funds in a bank
in his own name, this could be viewed as such a deviation as not to be in
the performance of duty, but it still would seem to be an act arising out of
an act done in the performance of duty, that is, collecting the money. It
seems doubtful that it would be more or less so if the deposit was made
with the intention of turning the money over to the bus company later, or
diverting it to the accused's own use.
In any event, there are certainly cases in which an act is done with the
requisite intent and is nevertheless unquestionably one arising out of, or
even directly in the performance of official duty. If, in In re Gilbert, supra,
note 13, the sentry used excessive force, it would constitute such a case,
and certainly many of the war crimes qualify. Introducing the test of the
specific intent with which an act was done thus not only adds an element
not expressly included in the NATO provision, but one which is clearly not
applicable to all cases and is of questionable application in any case. The
rejection of the Italian and Canadian proposals suggests the NATO
negotiators did not intend to impose such an added test. See Snee and Pye,
op. cit. supra, note 29, at 48-49.
" Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
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try him. The United States had such primary jurisdiction if what
he did was an offense "arising out of any act or omission done in
the performance of official duty"; Japan had such primary juris-
diction if it was not. If he launched the cartridge case to guard
the machine gun, then, however mistaken his judgment as to the
appropriateness of employing such drastic means—even if he
fired to kill—it seems clear that his act was within the provision.
The Japanese contention, supported by reference to Agreed View
No. 39,33 which defined "official duty" as "any duty or service re-
quired or authorized to be done by statute, regulation, the order
of a superior or military usage," that the killing was not au-
thorized, seems misconceived. As has been suggested, the issue
was not whether Girard's act was done in the performance of
official duty, as thus defined, but whether it was an offense
"arising from" an act so done.
If, on the other hand, Girard was engaged in horseplay, then
his act was a private act, not arising from, related to, or origi-
nating in the performance of his duty, and the United States did
not have primary jurisdiction.
Basically, then, the issue in the Girard case was one of fact,
which, since the United States waived jurisdiction, was not re-
solved.34
Our status of forces agreements vary in the recognition ac-
corded the concept as a basis of immunity. It was pointed out
83 Agreed to by the Criminal Panel, Jurisdiction Subcommittee on October
29, 1953; FEC Pamphlet No. 27-1, Criminal Jurisdiction in Japan, January
1956.
The affidavit of Robert Dechert, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, offered in the Girard case and published in an appendix to the
opinion of the Supreme Court, 354 U.S. 531, 542, states that a circular
of the United States Army Forces, Far East, in January 1956, stated
:
"The term 'official duty' as used in Article XVII, Official Minutes,
and the Agreed Views is not meant to include all acts by members of
the armed forces and civilian components during periods while they are
on duty, but is meant to apply only to acts which are required to be
done as a function of those duties which the individuals are performing.
Thus, a substantial departure from the acts a person is required to
perform in a particular duty usually will indicate an act outside of his
'official duty'."
84 After extended discussions in the Joint Committee, the United States,
on instructions from the Department of Defense, waived jurisdiction. See
Appendix B to the Opinion of the Court in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.
544, at 547.
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above that although the NATO Agreement gives primary juris-
diction to the sending state over both inter se offenses and
offenses in the performance of duty, the latter concession was
made only with reluctance. Some, though not all, of the other
status of forces agreements to which the United States is a party,
reflect a similar attitude.
The early Agreement relating to the Leased Bases did not refer
specifically either to inter se or duty-connected offenses.35 Juris-
diction was in large part determined by the place of the offense.
The United States had primary jurisdiction over most offenses
committed by "other than a British subject," e.g., a member of
the American forces or civilian component, if the offense was
committed within a base, but only concurrent jurisdiction if it
was committed outside a base. The issue of whether an offense
was inter se or duty-connected was of no moment.
The revised Leased Bases Agreement and the Bahamas Agree-
ment both take account of whether an offense is a "United States
interest" offense, as well as of the place where it occurs, but
neither makes any reference to whether the offense was duty-
connected. 36 If, in other words, a duty-connected offense is com-
mitted against a British subject, the latter fact outweighs the
former.
The Agreement with the Dominican Republic was particularly
interesting in this respect. Article XV gave the United States
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of its
forces and others subject to its military law except Dominican
nationals or local aliens, except with respect to offenses com-
mitted outside the sites against a Dominican national or local
alien. In the latter case, jurisdiction was concurrent, and the
Mixed Military Commission was to decide which government
should exercise jurisdiction "and shall give consideration to
whether the offense arose out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duties." That an offense was inter se was,
then, enough to give the United States exclusive jurisdiction, but
86 Except that some duty-connected offenses could constitute "offenses of a
military nature," as to which the United States had primary jurisdiction.
36 The more recent Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies, in
Article IX (3), follows the NATO formula, giving the United States primary
jurisdiction over "offences arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance of official duty." The Agreement with Australia includes an
identical provision, Article 8(3) (a) (ii).
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that it was committed in the performance of duty was not quite
enough. This was only a factor to be taken into account in re-
solving the conflict of jurisdiction and was to be weighed against
the fact the victim was a Dominican national or local alien.
The Philippines Agreement,37 on the other hand, gives the
United States exclusive jurisdiction over on-base offenses, and
over off-base offenses if they are either inter se (narrowly de-
fined) or committed by a member of the armed forces "while en-
gaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty." The
latter immunity does not, however, cover the civilian component.
The Libyan Agreement, which gives the United States exclusive
jurisdiction over on-base offenses by Americans, copies the NATO
Agreement provisions with respect to both inter se offenses and
offenses in the performance of duty, and extends the latter im-
munity to members of the civilian component. Finally, the Saudi
Arabian Agreement recognizes no immunity for offenses in the
performance of duty as such; Saudi Arabia has jurisdiction over
all offenses committed outside the described areas.
Broadly speaking, then, the concept of the duty-connected
offense has been given only limited application in post-World War
II treaties. The view that a sending state should have exclusive
or primary jurisdiction over offenses committed by a member of a
visiting force while on duty, i.e., predicating immunity on his on-
duty status, has not been expressly recognized in any agreement.
Even immunity for offenses committed in the performance of
duty, i.e., predicating immunity on the official nature of the act,
has been granted only with limitations or even not at all. The
explanation apparently lies in the great reluctance of receiving
states to surrender their jurisdiction over offenses against their
nationals. They are more prepared to surrender their jurisdiction
over offenses which are purely private acts but involve only mem-
87 Article XIII, par. 4 provides that "* * * If any offense falling under
paragraph 2 of this Article [giving the Philippines jurisdiction "over all
other offenses" committed outside the bases] is committed by any member
of the armed forces of the United States
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military
duty * * *
(b) * * * the fiscal * * * shall immediately notify the officer holding the
offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction."
The word "while" suggests the test is the status of the offender, not the
nature of the offense, but the words "actual performance" and "specific
military duty" narrow the scope of the immunity.
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bers of the sending state's military community than they are
over offenses committed in the performance of duty which involve
their own citizens.
DETERMINATION THAT THE OFFENSE WAS
DUTY-CONNECTED
Since whether the sending or receiving state has jurisdiction
may turn on whether the offense was committed in the per-
formance of duty, some procedure must be established for de-
ciding whether it was so committed. The ambiguity inherent in
the concept of performance of duty has made the procedural
question both crucial and productive of controversy.
Where the point has not been settled by agreement, the correct
view seems to be that the court which has custody of the accused,
rather than the military authorities of the sending state, has juris-
diction to decide the question. The State Department took this
position in the Hearings on the NATO Agreement.38 The cases in
which a person claims diplomatic immunity, or those where the
claim is made that a vessel or a corporation or other agency is
an instrumentality of a foreign government so employed as to
entitle it to immunity, provide close analogies. The issue is not,
however, analogous to the much debated question of whether the
executive or the judiciary of the territorial state should decide
such points. That is a question of the appropriate allocation
of power within the government of the territorial state. Such
issues are raised as whether the conduct of foreign affairs will
be embarrassed if such matters are not left to the executive.
88 A memorandum submitted by the State Department stated : "As a
matter of practice the court having custody of the accused has the right to
determine its own jurisdiction, i.e., whether the offense was committed in the
performance of official duty. It is understood that due weight will be given
to the views of the appropriate authorities of the visiting force as to
whether or not the offense was so committed." Hearings Before Senate
Foreign Relations Committee On Agreements Relating to Status of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Head-
quarters, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 68 (1953). See also the comments of Mr.
Phleger, Legal Advisor of the Department, id. p. 71. See also the Restate-
ment, Foreign Relations Law, Section 62, Comment c, p. 195: "Because the
question presents a jurisdictional issue, any tribunal deciding whether or
not to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case must make its own
finding. Acceptance of the certification of the commanding officer that an
accused serviceman was acting in the performance of duty when the act in
question was committed is one method of resolving this problem."
See also 2(b) of the Reporters' Notes to Section 65 at 206-207.
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Rather, the analogy is to the problem of the weight to be given,
in the kinds of cases cited, to a communication from the am-
bassador or other representative of the sending state to a court
or the foreign office of the territorial state on the matter of
status. On this, judicial decisions and the practice of states seem
in harmony that the communication is not conclusive, and that the
ultimate power to decide is in the court of the territorial state,
based on all the evidence.39
There are, however, persuasive arguments for permitting the
decision of whether an offense by a member of a visiting force
was committed in the performance of his official duty to be made
by his commanding officer. More is involved than is implied in
the statement that his commanding officer knows best what the
duties of the accused are. Inquiry by an agency of a foreign
government into the issue can involve an inquiry into the mis-
sion of the visiting force, its command structure, and comparable
matters. Security considerations may suggest the inappropriate-
88 There is some early authority which looks the other way. On this
whole question, see the exhaustive studies by A.B. Lyon, "The Conclusive-
ness of the Foreign Office Certificate," 1946 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 240; and
"The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestion' and Certificate of the American
State Department," 1947 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 116.
In the Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee On Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) after the action of the British Parliament in
providing that the certificate of the commanding officer should be sufficient
evidence until the contrary was shown had been commented on, the follow-
ing exchange occurred between Senator Ervin and Mr. Leigh, Ass't General
Counsel of the Department of Defense at p. 30
:
"Senator Ervin: I expect that position would harmonize pretty much with
our own civil law, that most courts would reserve the right to pass on that
question when it arises before them. So I don't know that we can complain
very much about that.
"Mr. Leigh: You can argue that this was a jurisdictional fact. Take the
situation for example, when an ambassador is tried in a case of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction. I would assume that the Supreme Court would
also reserve the right to determine whether it had jurisdiction in an am-
bassadorial case, but if the State Department gave a statement as to whether
an individual was or was not an ambassador, I think our Supreme Court
would probably regard it as conclusive for the determination of that
jurisdictional fact. I think it is a difficult question.
"Senator Ervin: I can understand that they would be very reluctant to
surrender that power. While it would be desirable for us if they would, I
don't think we can complain too much if they don't."
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ness of such an inquiry, particularly if the duties of the accused
lie in a sensitive area or concern intelligence. Moreover, time is
important where discipline is involved and the commanding officer
can act more quickly than the local authorities. 40
The cases decided without benefit of a treaty provision are in-
conclusive. In the Schwartzfiger case the Panamanian court con-
sidered as "established" by "the evidence of Major General Wil-
liam Lassiter, Commanding General of the American Army in
the Canal Zone" the fact, among others, that "in crossing that
city by Avenida Bolivar, in the discharge of his duty, Schwartz-
figer's car struck one of the pillars * * *." 41
The Mixed Courts of Egypt at first took the position that the
certificate of the commanding officer was determinative of the
issue. They later, however, retreated from this position, as they
did on the substantive issue of whether an offense "en service
commande" was exclusively within the jurisdiction of sending
state.42
The NATO Agreement does not deal expressly with the point.
The United States during the negotiations consistently took the
position, without recorded dissent by any other representative,
that the decision was for the military authorities of the sending
state.43 Several of the NATO members have, contrary to this
40
It was on this ground that the NATO negotiators rejected a proposal of
the Portuguese representative that an appeal to arbitration should be pro-
vided in order to decide whether an act had been done in the performance
of official duty. "It was pointed out that such arbitration was not con-
sistent with the speed required in the repression of criminal offenses."
MS-R(51)lr. The truth of this observation is illustrated by the Girard case.
The Reporter's Notes 2(b) to Section 65 of the Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law, state: "Notwithstanding the procedure followed in the
Girard case, the most satisfactory, and probably the most accurate, method
of determining whether or not an act was performed in the course of duty,
is to accept the certificate of the serviceman's commanding officer. This, of
course, requires the territorial state to trust that the authorities of the
force will act in good faith, but the agreement to admit the force must
presuppose that good faith will in fact be exercised."
41 21 A.J.I.L. 182, 184 (1927).
42 Supra, pp. 220, 222, notes 16 and 17.
48 "In reply to a further question raised by the Netherlands Representa-
tive, the Chairman [Brig. Gen. Snow, U.S.] pointed out that it would be for
the sending State to decide whether the members of a force were on official
duty or not. This was part of the normal cooperation between allies."
MC(J)-R(51)5.
The United States Representative "pointed out, however, that there was
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understanding, been reluctant to treat the certificate of the ac-
cused's commanding officer as controlling.
The Bill introduced in the British Parliament to implement the
NATO Agreement gave controlling effect to the certificate. This
prompted some protest—though nothing like that against the
provision which made conclusive a certificate that the person
named was a member of the visiting force—and the Home Secre-
tary proposed an amendment, which became a part of the Act,
under which the certificate is sufficient evidence unless the con-
trary is proved.44 This departure from the position taken by the
a possibility of offences being committed in the performance of an official
duty; the military authorities of the sending State, and not those of the
receiving State, were alone capable of deciding whether or not an official
duty was being carried out at the time." MS-R (51) 14.
The United States Representative "stated that for obvious reasons of
military discipline, his Government would not be likely to accept the possi-
bility of leaving any authorities other than the military authorities free to
decide whether or not an offence had been committed in the performance
of official duty." MS-R (51) 14.
"Although the Status of Forces Agreement does not specify who shall
have the authority to make a final determination as to such matters, it is
the position of the Department of Defense, based upon the minutes of the
NATO working group which drafted the SOF Agreement, that such de-
termination should properly rest with the authorities of the sending state."
General Hickman, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 28.
"505 H.C. Deb. (5th Ser.) 595 (1952); 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 1183,
1187 (1952).
It is interesting that, when moving the second reading of the Bill, un-
amended, in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Simonds, in
referring to the determination of whether an offense was committed in the
course of duty, said: "There is no other way to deal with such a matter
except to give to one authority or the other the absolute right to say
whether the act which was done was done in the course of duty." 177 H.L.
Deb. (5th Ser.) 463 June 26, 1952, col. 463. In the subsequent discussion
of the amendment Earl Jowitt, ex-Lord Chancellor, objected on the ground
that if the certificate was not conclusive, there could be controversy, and
there should be no uncertainty regarding which court has jurisdiction. 177
H.L. Deb. (5th Ser.) 466-70 (1952).
There was no reference to the Summary Record of the NATO negotiations,
which was at the time still classified.
See the comments of General Hickman and Mr. Leigh, Hearings, Sub-
committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at 29-30.
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United States in the NATO negotiations, acquiesced in by the
other members, has made no real difference in practice.45
France has agreed to accept the determination of the American
military authorities that an offense was committed in the per-
formance of duty, provided the determination is made by a staff
judge advocate or other legal officer. 46 Earlier difficulties with
Turkey have also been resolved,47 as have those with Italy, though
less satisfactorily. 48
The situation in Japan, so much mooted in the Girard case,
resembles that in the United Kingdom. The Agreed Minutes to
the Administrative Agreement provide that a certificate of
official duty issued by the commanding officer "shall, in any
judicial proceedings, be sufficient evidence of the fact unless the
contrary is proved," but the certificate "shall not be interpreted
to prejudice in any way Article 318 of the Japanese Code of
Criminal Procedure," which reserves to the court power to deter-
mine matters of fact. 49 But Agreed View No. 43 50 provides
that if the Chief Proescutor considers that there is proof con-
*« "While such a certificate is not, under the Act, conclusive evidence, in
practice no disputes have arisen on this point between the American au-
thorities and those of the United Kingdom. The British courts have con-
sistently accepted the determination made by the local commanders * * *."
Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreements: Criminal Jurisdiction 51-52
(1957).
" Gen. Hickman, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee On Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces
Treaty, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1957).
* 7 The Turkish authorities initially took the position the Turkish courts
would decide the issue, and in some cases they did so. On July 16, 1956
a law was passed which provided that "the basis regarding the establishment
of the status of duty" would be decided by the two governments. Shortly
afterward, on July 28, an agreement was reached that a certificate of the
highest ranking officer of the United States forces in Turkey would be ac-
cepted by the Turkish courts. General Hickman, id. at 17, 35; Snee and
Pye, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 52. The agreed procedure has occasioned
difficulty because American installations are spread around the country, and
the issuance and delivery of a certificate may be delayed until after trial in
a Turkish court has begun. Id. at 52.
* 8 No statute or decree governs the situation in Italy. The Italian authori-
ties have informally agreed that the determination is for the American mili-
tary authorities and in general the courts have acquiesced, but some
prosecuting officials have demurred. Id. at 53.
49
Id. at 53.
50 Supra, p. 229, note 33.
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tradicting the certificate, the matter should be referred to the
Joint Committee. It was the inability of the Joint Committee to
agree which prolonged the controversy in the Girard case.
The Agreement with West Germany is in this regard more
nearly in keeping with the understanding of the NATO negotia-
tors. The certificate of the "highest appropriate authority of such
sending State" is almost, but not quite, conclusive.51
The relevant provisions of the Agreement with the Philippines
is in sharp contrast with the understanding reached by the NATO
negotiators. Where an offense is both off-base and not inter se,
so that the Philippines may have jurisdiction, the decision as to
whether the offense was committed while the accused was "en-
gaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty" is
for the Philippine prosecutor. The American commander may
appeal from an adverse decision to the Secretary of Justice, but
the Secretary's decision is final.52
The Dominican Agreement left to the Mixed Military Commis-
sion the decision of whether or not the fact that an offense arose
out of any act or omission done in the performance of duty should
be given weight in allocating jurisdiction. Presumably, the Com-
mission was to determine whether the act was so done. 53 The
Libyan Agreement is silent on the point.
In summary, it seems that where there is no treaty provision
on the question, the decision is for the court which has custody
of the accused—which may, of course, be a court-martial of the
sending state. The agreements to which the United States is a
party are in most instances silent on the point ; only the Japanese,
the West German, The Federation of the West Indies, and the
61 Article 18. Paragraph 2 of the Article provides that "The German Court
or authority shall make its decision in conformity with the certificate. In ex-
ceptional cases, however, such certificate may, at the request of the German
court or authority, be made the subject of review through discussions be-
tween the Federal Government and the diplomatic mission in the Federal
Republic of the sending State."
The Agreement with the Federation of The West Indies provides, in
Article IX (11) that "A certificate of the appropriate United States com-
manding officer that an offence arose out of an act or omission done in the
performance of official duty shall be conclusive, but the commanding officer
shall give consideration to any representation made by the Government of
the Territory." The Agreement with Australia is silent on this point.
62 Article XIII, 4.
"Article XV, (l)(b).
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Philippines Agreements are explicit, and they lay down quite
different rules. The NATO negotiators did reach a clear under-
standing, contrary to the usual rule, that the decision was for
the military authorities of the sending state. They did not, how-
ever, embody their understanding in the Agreement. The Written
Record was classified for such a long period that some NATO
members did not comply with the understanding. Subsequent
negotiations have brought the situation in some countries near
that contemplated, but not even the German Agreement accepts it
in toto. There is, then, no generally applicable rule on this cru-
cial issue.
